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Can countercyclical bank capital requirements reduce the negative effects of
global liquidity shocks? We use the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as a natural
experiment to document the role of the banking system as a transmission channel
of global financial disturbances to domestic economies. Using granular and con-
fidential data from the Bank of Portugal, our results suggest that in the aftermath
of the Lehman collapse, domestic firms cut investment by 14% and employment
by 2.3%. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of macroprudential regulation, we
model an open-economy with a banking sector borrowing from domestic and in-
ternational depositors. We show that, during a financial crises, in an economy
with countercyclical bank capital requirements (compared with an economy with
constant capital requirements): (i) gross domestic product falls 5 p.p. less and (ii)
the fall in investment is 3 p.p. lower. We show that imposing countercyclical cap-
ital requirements entails a trade-off between lower volatility and lower economic
activity. Overall, we find that countercyclical bank capital requirements may not
be welfare improving for the Portuguese economy.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis had its beginning in the U.S. but spilled over globally with
severe economic consequences. In fact, in the aftermath of the great recession, global
gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 8 p.p.. The importance of global financial cycles
to capital inflows and asset prices has been widely recognized (Rey (2013)). Global
banks serve as the main transmission channel, fueling financial shocks from core
financial centers to domestic economies.1 While there is a growing body of literature
trying to establish the connection between shocks to banks’ balance sheets and credit
freezes, less is known about the impact of these negative shocks on economic indicators
such as investment and employment. A weakened financial system and its negative
consequences on the economy revived the need for rethinking policies prescriptions
to deal with systemic risk in financial markets. At the forefront is the debate on the
effectiveness of macroprudential regulation.2
In this paper, we make two main contributions. First, we show how the banking
system served as a pass-through of global financial shocks, contributing to the decrease
in economic activity in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. We use the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy as a natural experiment. Exploiting the heterogeneus exposure
of Portuguese banks to the international wholesale market, we show how a weakened
banking sector responded by lowering credit supply, causing a decrease in investment
and employment in Portugal. After documenting the causal link between global
financial shocks and changes in the domestic economy, our second contribution uses
a theoretical model to quantify the impact of imposing countercyclical bank capital
requirements to curb down the impact of these exogenous disturbances. Our findings
add to the important debate on alternative policies to deal with financial crisis by (i)
quantifying the benefits of countercyclical bank capital requirements during a financial
crisis and (ii) documenting and quantifying the trade-off the economy faces when
implementing such policy.
The 2008 financial recession brought a liquidity drought in the international in-
terbank wholesale market, spilling over to the Portuguese economy. In fact, after the
Lehman Brothers collapse, credit growth started to decrease in Portugal.3 Contempo-
raneous with the Lehman fall, investment and employment by Portuguese firms also
1A non-exhaustive list is: Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2013), De Haas and Van Horen (2013), Haas and Lelyveld (2014).
2See, for example, Blanchard et al. (2010), bank for International Settlements-International Mone-
tary Fund (2011), and bank for International Settlements-International Monetary Fund (2016).
3See Figure (9) in appendix (A.1).
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collapsed. Two years after the Lehman fall, employment in Portugal decreased by 5.4%
and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) dropped by 14.3%.4 From these sequence of
events, one might be tempted to conclude that causality runs from disturbances in a
core financial center to negative consequences for economies abroad. However, credit
levels are the equilibrium outcome of maximizing decisions made by creditors and
debtors. Banks may be unable or unwilling to supply credit to the productive side
of the economy due to worsening international wholesale market conditions (credit
supply channel). The same equilibrium credit level drop might also be caused by a fall
in demand for credit. In fact, when economic conditions worsen, firms may have lower
profitable investment opportunities or face lower demand for their products, leading
to lower credit demand (credit demand channel).
We begin our paper by quantifying the importance of the banking system as a
pass-through of the Lehman default shock to the Portuguese economy (credit supply
channel). To that extent, we use highly granular and confidential data from the Bank
of Portugal to build a dataset consisting of loan-level data covering virtually the entire
population of banks and firms operating in the Portuguese territory. Portugal serves
as a suitable test laboratory for our natural experiment for three main reasons: (i)
the Lehman collapse was exogenous to the Portuguese economy (ii) there was no
real estate bubble and (iii) Portuguese firms are highly dependent on credit from the
banking sector.
Our identification strategy divides the causal chain into two parts. In the first part,
we use a difference-in-difference design comparing lending before and after September
2008, exploiting the quasi-experimental variation in the dependence of Portuguese
banks on international interbank markets. Our main identification strategy hinges on
isolating a firm borrowing from banks with different exposure to international markets
(Khwaja and Mian (2008)). We find that following the Lehman collapse, the drop in
credit supply is higher for banks more dependent on international financial markets.
After establishing the drop in credit supply following the Lehman fall, the second part
of the causal link uses an instrumental variable approach to show how lower credit
supply fuels into a drop in aggregate investment and employment. We report that a
one-percentage point decrease in credit supply lowers investment by 1.05 percentage
points and employment by 0.16 p.p.. A partial equilibrium analysis suggests that,
during the 2004 − 2012 period, the liquidity shock to banks’ balance sheet brought
by the Lehman fall accounts for 2/3 of the aggregate drop in investment and a 39%
share of the drop in aggregate employment. Therefore, we provide empirical evidence
4See Figures (11) and (12) in appendix (A.1).
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supporting the hypothesis that the banking sector acts as a crucial pass-through of
foreign disturbances to the real economy.
We continue our paper by outlining a structural model to study the effectiveness
of macroprudential policy to deal with exogenous negative disturbances. Changes
in credit supply due to exogenous shocks produce general equilibrium effects and
spillovers that cannot be fully accounted for by our empirical methodology. Using
a theoretical model offers several advantages: not only can we account for general
equilibrium effects, but also it offers an interpretation of the causal relationships we find
in the empirical section as well as a test laboratory for key counterfactual experiments.
To that extent, we build an open-economy model with a banking sector borrowing from
domestic and international depositors. We calibrate the model resorting to indirect
inference to estimate key parameters. That is, we use the empirical model as an
auxiliary model to calibrate the employment and investment block of the structural
model.
Our main thought experiment studies the effect of imposing macroprudential
policy in the form of countercyclical bank capital requirements in the spirit of Basel III.
Imposing this type of friction has the benefit of correcting a moral hazard problem on
the part of the banking sector as well as of eliminating over-leverage in the economy.
We show how macroprudential policies can curb down leverage, improve banks’ net
worth and lower the dependence on foreign debt. We provide two main findings. First,
countercyclical bank capital requirements lowers macroeconomic volatility. During a
financial crisis, gross domestic product (GDP) becomes 5 p.p. less volatile, the fall
in banks’ net worth is 2 p.p. lower, and investment volatility decreases by 3 p.p..
Second, using simulated data we also document that the number of economic crises
drops by 1 p.p.. However, the downside of macroprudential policy is a decrease in
level of economic activity. In fact, we quantify how average GDP falls by 1 p.p. over
the entire simulated data sample. Therefore, we show how imposing countercyclical
capital requirements imply a trade-off between lower volatility and lower economic
activity.
The intuition for this trade-off is that, during periods of economic prosperity,
a banking system with countercyclical capital requirements is asked to hold more
funds as net worth. Therefore, compared with an economy with constant capital
requirements, it will be able to provide less credit, leading to less investment and
lower economy activity. However, the upside of a banking sector with countercyclical
capital requirements is that the financial sector builds a capital buffer that can be used
during a financial crises, dampening the negative effects of disturbances in the financial
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system and maintaining credit to the real economy.
Finally, we study the welfare implications of imposing countercyclical capital
requirements. Given the aforementioned trade-off, can countercyclical bank capital
requirements be welfare improving? Overall, we find this type of policy not to be
welfare improving for the Portuguese economy. However, the answer may depends
on the state of the economy. We find that, when compared with constant bank capital
requirements, having a banking sector with countercyclical capital requirements will
be welfare improving if the economy (i) is in a recession, or (ii) has low aggregate
credit.
Literature review: Our paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, we
add to the literature that studies the international transmission of financial crises.
Earlier examples are Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) that
study the transmission of the Japanese banking crises to the United states. Although
recent papers have provided empirical evidence of a credit drop following external
liquidity shocks, the literature is still shy on the effect of such shocks on the real
economy.5 By building a rich dataset of loan-level data, this paper contributes to this
literature by showing how a global shock to banks’ balance sheets lowers investment
and employment in Portugal.6 Methodologically, we build on the work of Khwaja and
Mian (2008).
Second, our paper also contributes to the literature on macroeconomic effects of
macroprudential policy. Jiménez et al. (2017) studies the introduction of dynamic
provision macroprudential tool in Spain. The authors provide empirical evidence
on how countercyclical capital buffers can smooth credit in recessions. We build a
structural model to complement and echo their findings. Besides echoing the positive
effects of countercyclical bank capital requirements in recessions, we complement this
study by quantifying the negative effects for long-run economic activity of these policy
tools.7
5For example, Schnabl (2012) studies credit disturbances on Peruvian banks due to the Russian
default. Iyer et al. (2014) uses the Portuguese credit register showing a credit drop following the 2007
interbank liquidity shock.
6Other example of work studying the impact of global shock on the real economy are Paravisini et
al. (2015), who studies how a credit shortage affects exports, and Chodorow-Reich (2014), who provides
evidence of a decrease in employment in the US in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Recent
papers also study the impact of financial shocks on firm behavior, showing how leveraged firms tend
to increase worker layoffs (e.g. Giroud and Mueller (2017) and Buera and Karmakar (2018)). Finally, a
paper closer to ours is Cingano et al. (2016).
7Other examples of empirical studies are Igan and Kang (2011) that use the South Korean expe-
rience with loan-to-value and debt-to-income regulation to document how these type of policies can
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Third, the model we develop in this paper is at the intersection of two literatures:
the literature on credit market imperfections and the open-economy literature study-
ing sudden-stop crises. Our theoretical framework builds on the work of Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) that introduces financial intermediaries
in a standard business-cycle model8. Contrary to most of this literature, our main focus
is on the international consequences of the 2007 − 2009 financial crises. To do so, we
extend the aforementioned authors’ framework by including international investors
lending to the domestic banking sector. Also, as in the open-economy literature, the
return on credit in our model depends on the foreign interest rate as well as on the
level of foreign-debt-to-gdp. Finally, we also add a domestic regulator setting macro-
prudential policy. We contribute to this literature by analysing and quantifying the
effectiveness of countercyclical bank capital requirements to curb down the negative
effects of external shocks to the banking sector. A related set of papers also studies
macroprudential policy in a similar framework. Aoki et al. (2016) focus on macropru-
dential capital taxes and Akinci and Queralto (2017) study the effectiveness of bank
equity injections and constant bank capital requirements. Our paper differs from these
studies by focusing on the recent Basel III accord implementation of countercyclical
bank capital requirements.9
Fourth, capital flow reversals have been studied in the open-economy literature,
arguing for capital controls and macroprudential policies aimed at correcting pecuniary
externalities (e.g. Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2018)). The literature on
sudden stops stresses the need to reduce overborrowing in international markets,
whereas our paper focus on reducing bank leverage by improving banks’ net worth.
Our results corroborate the need for macroprudential policy for financial stabilization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2) we provide a descrip-
tion of data, the empirical strategy and empirical results. In section (3) we analyse the
robustness of our empirical findings. Section (4) provides a description of the theo-
retical model. Section (5) explains how we proceed with our quantitative exercise. In
section (6) we analyse the mechanism through which capital flows fuel into the domes-
tic economy. Section (7) studies the use of countercyclical bank capital requirements.
We conclude in section (8).
control house price appreciation. Bruno et al. (2017) uses a panel of 12 Asian countries to show that
macroprudential measures can curb down both bank inflows as well as bond inflows.
8Other examples are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014))
9Other papers studying capital requirements are Van den Heuvel (2008), Repullo and Suarez (2013)
and Karmakar (2016).
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2 A Natural Experiment on the impact of capital inflows
on the domestic economy
This section has two main purposes. First, showing the causal impact of a foreign
exogenous disturbance on the domestic supply of credit and subsequent impact on do-
mestic aggregate macroeconomic variables. Second, it provides estimated parameters
to inform the calibration exercise of the theoretical model in section (4). We use the
Lehman brothers collapse to show how such episode can trigger a causal chain going
from capital inflow reversals and an international shock to the balance sheet of Por-
tuguese banks culminating in lower credit supply to Portuguese firms and subsequent
drop in investment and employment. The section proceeds in five steps: Section (2.1)
discusses the Portuguese economic and financial environment during the financial
crisis. Section (2.2) describes the empirical setting and our data. Section (2.3) presents
the identification strategy. Section (2.4) is the first step in the causal chain, showing
how the Lehman fall resulted in lower credit supply. Section (2.5) is the second step
and shows the fall in investment and employment due to the fall in credit supply.
2.1 Lehman Backruptcy and the Behavior of Portuguese firms and
banks
In September 15, 2008 the Lehman Brothers investment bank filled for bankruptcy,
making it the biggest bankruptcy case in US history, and becoming the most important
chapter of the subprime mortgage crisis. The recession was triggered by a real state
bubble and a sharp fall in housing prices. Although the subprime crisis had reper-
cussions worldwide, on impact they did not affect the Portuguese economy. There
are two main reasons why the subprime crisis had a smaller impact in Portugal: (i)
Over the period 1970 − 2014 the economy witnessed a flat path of real housing prices.
(Lourenço and Rodrigues (2015)) (ii) Portuguese banks did hold a scarce exposure to
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDS).
Portugal is a small and open economy where the banking sector – due to low
domestic savings – relies heavily on funds raised internationally. Moreover, the high
reliance of firms on credit from the banking sector is a feature of the European mar-
ket shared by Portuguese non-financial companies. The subprime mortgage crisis also
brought distress to the international interbank market, leading to increases in interbank
market spreads and market freezes. Although Portuguese banks hold a significant ex-
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posure to the international wholesale market – e.g. 17% of deposits and debt securities
hold by German banks and 16.74% hold by banks outside the monetary union – aspects
of the Portuguese regulation made investment on instruments like off-balance sheet
vehicles funded by asset backet commercial paper (ABCP) more difficult. (Acharya
and Schnabl (2010)) For this reason, Portuguese banks were not as affected by the
ABCP market freeze that happened in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse. We use
the heterogeneous exposure of Portuguese banks to the international interbank market
as a source of variation to understand the effect of the Lehman default on the behavior
of investment and employment. Although our focus is on supply side explanations,
we knowledge the importance of demand side reasons for the decline several macroe-
conomic variables. Section (2.5) discusses the relative significance of both sources of
variation.
2.2 Data
In this section we describe the data sources – and dataset construction – used to provide
a causal link between credit supply by Portuguese banks and changes in investment
and employment decisions by Portuguese firms. We build a comprehensive data
set combining information from three administrative data sources: we match credit
register data with bank’s balance sheet data and firm’s economic and balance sheet
variables. The source of data is the Bank of Portugal which – being the supervisor and
regulator of the Portuguese banking sector – holds confidential data on virtually all
credit-market transactions made in the Portuguese territory.
The first dataset contains information on credit extended by Portuguese credit-
granting institutions to households and non-financial corporations and is called ”Cen-
tral Credit Responsibility Database” (central de responsabilidades de crédito) (CCR on-
wards). The CCR is a confidential and very comprehensive dataset holding reports on
all credit supplied by institutions operating in the Portuguese territory.10 While most
European central banks hold records of loans granted domestically, the Portuguese
CCR holds special relevance since it is one of the most comprehensive country-wide
CCR data sets, reporting all credit with a minimum loan registration of 50 euros.11 For
10The following is a list of entities included in CCR: banks, saving banks, mutual agricultural credit
banks, financial credit institutions, leasing companies, factoring companies, securitization companies,
mutual guarantee societies, and financial companies for credit acquisitions.
11Since 2008 the Portuguese CCR reports all loans made by Portuguese banks to Portuguese non-
financial institutions with a value higher than 50 euros. Before 2008 the minimum threshold was even
lower – all loans above 10 euros were reported. Reporting threshold for the Spanish credit register is
6, 000 EUR
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this project we focus only on credit granted to non-financial corporations and exclude
credit to individuals. The frequency of the data is monthly.
The second dataset provides information on bank’s balance sheet (BBS) and is ex-
tracted from the Monetary Financial Institutions Balance Sheet (Balanço das Instituições
Monetárias e Financeiras). This data set is compiled by the central bank of Portugal,
reporting detailed information on the assets and liabilities of the monetary financial
institutions (MFIs) operating in Portugal. The original data in on at monthly frequency
spanning 1997-2017.
The third source is a dataset on firm’s financial and economic variables. The Cen-
tral Balance Sheet Database (CBSD) (central de balanços) is a confidential data and is
property of the central bank of Portugal, reporting accounting information spanning
almost all firms operating in Portuguese territory. It provides very extensive informa-
tion on employment, balance sheet and other economic variables. The frequency of
the data is annual.
Our final dataset combines all three sources of information, encompassing 56
credit-granting institutions, more than 300.000 non-financial corporations and around
5 Million recorded loans.
Table (A.2) provides an overview on the characteristics of non-financial corpora-
tions present in our dataset. The first three columns report firm characteristics based
on the level of exposure of banks – to international wholesale markets – that lend those
firms. The last column reports values for the whole sample. Table (A.1) describes the
situation of the banking sector along the most pertinent dimensions. The first three
columns report bank descriptive statistics based on the level of exposure to interna-
tional wholesale markets. The main take-away is that both groups of banks do not
differ considerably along the reported dimensions.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe how we identify the causal impact of the Lehman collapse
on domestic macroeconomic variables. Estimating the causal effect of capital inflow
reversals on credit supply by Portuguese Banks to the non-financial sector poses several
identification hurdles.
First, realized credit levels are the equilibrium outcome of maximizing decisions
made by creditors and debtors. Figure (10) shows a dry-up of domestic bank’s inter-
national interbank market borrowing. By itself, this fact is not evidence of a credit
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supply decline. Banks may be unable or unwilling to supply credit to the productive
side of the economy due worsening international wholesale market conditions. But the
same equilibrium credit level drop might also be due to a fall in demand for credit. In
fact, when economic conditions worsen, firms may have lower profitable investment
opportunities. For these reasons (and the below arguments) the time-series in figure
9 is not concluding evidence of a credit supply decline. Second, firm’s unobserved
characteristics might blur the identification exercise. During an economic downturn,
it will be reasonable to argue that banks prefer lending to less riskier firms12. However,
more capitalized firms also search for more credit during downturns since the demand
for their products is less affected.
Third, firms can substitute borrowing sources or create new credit relationships
(extensive margin). Fourth, even if banks receive a shock to their balance sheet, they
may still find alternative lending sources. That is, after the Lehman collapse, even if
Portuguese banks suffer from lack of international funding, they may be able to keep
the same lending rate to Portuguese firms if alternative lending sources exist or if the
bank could find room in the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet. (Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2011)) Finally, the matching between firms and banks may not be random.
For example, weaker banks might specialize in lending to firms with higher credit
risk. Suppose the Lehman collapse has a higher impact on the balance sheet of weaker
banks. Intuition might leads us to conclude that those banks would decrease funding
the most. However, the data might show an increase in credit. This could be due to
higher credit demand, as is plausible that riskier firms need more funding during an
economic downturn, leading us to conclude that the Lehman collapse culminated in a
credit supply increase to Portuguese firms.
All of the above arguments pose a threat to the causal link between the Lehman
bankruptcy and the drop in investment and employment in Portugal. To tackle this
issues, we are going to perform our empirical analysis in two steps. First, we will
show how the Lehman collapse caused a decrease in credit supply by Portuguese
banks. Our main identification channel will focus on a given firm borrowing from two
(or more) banks with different levels of exposure to global interbank markets. If a firm
receives less credit from a bank more exposed to international credit markets then,
ceteris paribus, we can conclude that an exogenous disturbance causes a fall in domestic
credit supply. Specifically, we will construct a within-firm difference-in-difference
model of credit. Second, we establish that a fall in credit supply led to an investment
12This is not necessarily the case as some banks – specially banks in worse financial conditions – might
even prefer lending to riskier firms in search for yield. (ever-greening) (see, e.g., Jiménez et al. (2014))
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drop by Portuguese firms. To perform this last step, we use an instrumental variable
approach in which we use the weighted exposure of each firm to international markets
as an instrument.13 Therefore, our empirical model is
∆ ln(X f ,t) = β1 + β2∆ ln(Credit f ,t) + ε f ,t (1)
where X = {Investment,Employment}. The dependent variable is the log of total
investment by firm f at time t and the independent variable is the log of overall credit
supplied by the domestic banking sector to firm f during period t. The coefficient β2 of
regression (1) gives the elasticity of investment to credit supply. The following sections
describe the steps needed to arrive at our main goal while addressing all identification
problems recognized above.
2.4 From capital inflows to credit supply
This section is the first estimation step in our causal chain, identifying the causal
relation between an exogenous disturbance and changes in domestic credit supply.
We use the fall of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock. Our empirical design
builds on a firm-bank level difference-in-difference specification comparing lending
before and after the Lehman bankruptcy by exploiting the variation in bank exposure
to international wholesale markets. The model is given by
∆ ln(Credit f ,b,t) = αi + µBank Exposureb + γb,tXb,t + η f ,b,t (2)
where the dependent variable is average credit from bank b to firm f at time t.
Time t = {Pre,Post} takes two periods: the period before and after November 2008
(the quarter of the Lehman collapse).14 Each period corresponds to four years. The
independent variable corresponds to the ratio of interbank borrowing to total assets by
domestic bank b from international institutions15. To correct for endogeneity concerns,
we use information on Bank Exposure during the 2004 period. Postt is a dummy variable
equal to one when t = Post.
13Amiti and Weinstein (2018) use a different methodology than ours to document the aggregate effect
of credit supply on investment.
14We motivate our use of two periods – before and after the shock – and averaging along periods by
the fact that economic variables tend to be correlated over time, leading to serially correlated errors.
(Bertrand et al. (2004))
15These international lenders are comprised of international finance granting institutions providing
deposits up to two years.
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α f is firm fixed effects, controlling for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
at the firm level. This within-firm specification serves as a proxy for the demand
of credit. (Khwaja and Mian (2008)) This specification requires firms to hold credit
relationship with at least two banks, which is true for 55% of firms in our dataset. γbt
is a vector of variables controlling for bank’s specific observable characteristics. The
coefficient µ measures how changes in capital inflows through the banking channel
influence credit supply by domestic banks.
Xb,t is a vector of bank observables that serve as controls. Namely, we include
return on assets, serving as a proxy for Tobin’s Q. As in (Cingano et al. (2016)), we also
include Cash-hold-assets as control for financial frictions. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. As further controls we also include cash flow, solvability, debt ratio
and colateral. We show that results are robust to alternative clustering methods by
running a model with standard errors clustered at the location-sector-size level.
The main identification assumption in our within-firm estimation of equation (2)
is that banks and firms did not anticipate the exogenous shock and acted accordingly
by changing their credit behavior. This seems an innocuous assumption as the Lehman
collapse was due to financial disturbances originated in the US financial system and
are unrelated with the Portuguese financial sector. To make sure our identification
results hold, we use Bank Exposureb as the ratio of interbank deposits to total assets
measured in 2004. Another assumption is the random matching between firms and
banks. Section 3 discusses the validity of this assumption.
Results: Table (A.3) column (4) presents our main result for this subsection. The
estimation of equation (2) shows how, following the fall of Lehman Brothers, banks
more exposed to international interbank credit markets lower credit supply more
than banks relying more on funding from the domestic market. This relationship is
statistically significant and shows how a one percentage point increase in the ratio of
bank’s foreign liabilities to total assets predicts a reduction in credit supply of 0.792
percentage points. Using our initial intuition: a firm borrowing from two (or more)
banks will see credit supply decreased by the more exposed bank via-à-vis remaining
(less exposed) banks. Table (A.3) Column (3) reports results when we do not control
for bank observables. We conclude that a country with a banking sector with more
exposure to capital flows will have larger drop in credit supply following a negative
disturbance arising in international financial markets.
Table (A.3) column (1) and (2) report the estimation results of equation (2) when
we do not control for firm fixed-effects. Qualitative results using OLS are still in line
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with the results using the within-firm specification.
2.5 From credit supply to real outcomes
Having established in the previous subsection how foreign negative financial distur-
bances fuel into lower credit supply, this section provides evidence on the connection
between lower credit supply and a decrease in aggregate investment and employment.
The goal is to estimate equation (1) using the following model
∆ ln(X f t) = β1 + β2∆ ln(Credit f t) × Postt + ε f t (3)
Where X = {investment, employment} and β2 measures the impact of credit supply
on firm’s investment (and employment) decisions.
So far we have been employing a firm-bank level estimation procedure. In contrast
with the model in the previous section, the empirical model in this section is at the firm
level. That means, we can no longer use within-firm estimation to disentangle credit
supply from credit demand. To continue using only credit supply to explain changes
in employment and investment following the Lehman bankruptcy, we perform the
estimation using a 2SLS methodology where in the first stage we use Bank Exposure at
the firm level as an instrument. We have defined capital flows before as the share of
bank exposure (to international interbank market) to assets. In this section we revise
the definition since we only operate at the firm level. We now define Firm Exposure as
indirect exposure of each firm f to the international wholesale market, weighted by
the share of credit from each bank b. (see section (3.1) for a detailed definition). The
first stage model is defined as
∆ ln(Credit f t) = αi + µ∆(Firm Exposure f ) + γbtXbt + η f t (4)
where
Firm Exposure f =
∑
b
w f b(Bank Exposureb)
weights w f b representing the share of credit from bank b to firm i in 2004.
Unfortunately an OLS regression of (4) would be biased since the between-firm
specification cannot account for firm fixed effects coefficientα f . Recall our initial identi-
fication strategy intuition relies on controlling for within-firm effects: compare changes
in the share of credit from banks with different levels of exposure to international fi-
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nancial markets to the same firm. Turns out we correct for the bias by substituting
α f using an estimated α̂ f computed using equation (2)16 (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette
(2012)).
Results: Table (A.4) provides estimates for equation (3). Following the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy firms borrowing from domestic banks more exposed to interna-
tional markets experience a larger decline in investment and employment. Column
(3) shows how a one percentage point decrease in credit supply lowers investment
by 1.045 percentage points. In other words, there is a 1.045 p.p. pass-through of the
credit shock into investment. Column (5) shows how a one percentage point decrease
in credit supply lowers employment by 0.164 percentage points. The smaller elasticity
of employment to credit supply is not surprising as investment tends to be much more
volatile than employment. Table (A.4) columns (2) and (4) report results for the same
estimation for investment and employment, respectively, but without controlling for
firm specific characteristics. Results remain economically and statistically significant.
We can conclude that a negative disturbance in international financial centers has a
sizeable negative impact on domestic macroeconomic variable, namely investment
and employment.
Aggregate implications: To provide some further economic meaning to our results,
we can perform a (partial equilibrium) back of the envelope calculation to understand
what was the aggregate impact of the banking channel as a pass-through of a global
shock into the domestic economy. The average share of bank foreign liabilities over
assets during the 2004 period was around 16%. For simplicity, we operate under the
assumption that credit supply by banks not exposed to the international interbank
market is constant (This is a conservative assumption since we could safely assume
that these banks also decreased credit supplied to firms during the period of the
shock). From table (A.3) we learn that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of foreign liabilities
causes a 1.064 drop in credit supply. Thus, the aggregate drop in credit supply was
17%. From table (A.4) we have the coefficients from the impact of a drop in credit
supply on investment and employment. Therefore, we can calculate a overall decrease
in investment of 14.8% due to the drop in credit supply and also a aggregate drop
in employment of 2.3% due to lower credit supply. Using aggregate values for the
change in average investment and employment following the fall of Lehman Brothers,
16See Jiménez et al. (2018) for an alternative strategy to deal with bias created by not including firm
fixed-effects.
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we can arrive to an aggregate drop in employment of 6% and investment of 24%. We
conclude that our back of the envelope calculation suggests that a liquidity shock in
banks balance sheet accounts of 2/3 of the drop in investment over the pre and post
period and a 38% share of the drop in employment.17
2.6 How persistent was the Lehman shock?










































Notes: The right panel shows regression coefficients of equation (4) when the dependent variable is the change in
logs of employment. The left panel shows regression coefficients of equation (4) when the dependent variable is the
change in logs of investment. For each point in the x-axis the post period in equation (3) is defined as {2009,X}
where X is the value in the x-axis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The stars above each point
represent statistical significance for each regression.
So far we have concluded that the liquidity shock on bank’s balance sheet provided
by the Lehman fall has a significant pass-through on investment and employment
decisions. How persistent is this shock? Figure (1) plots the coefficient of equation
(3) for different time intervals of the post period. Following the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, firms investment dropped by 0.5 p.p. compared with the period before
the financial crisis. Employment also decrease by 0.25 p.p. on impact. The effect of
the shock on investment is amplified over time and has a peak around the 2011− 2012
period. This increase can be understood in light of the economic uncertainty generated
by the financial crisis. As for employment, the effect of the shock is diluted over time
17Paravisini et al. (2015) also study the effect of a liquidity shock on real outcomes. They design a
similar experiment and find that in Peru the share of missing volume of trade due to a credit shock was
16%.
15
as the effect looses power and statistical significance. In fact, the coefficient is no longer
statistically significant in 2012. The stickiness of employment to the credit shock is to
be expected as employment is less volatile than investment. As a caveat, the effect of
the shock posterior to 2011 should be taken with caution as another major shock hit
the domestic economy – the European sovereign debt crisis. The compound effect of
the shock on investment amounts to 3.9 p.p. decrease and the accumulative effect on
employment is around 0.9 p.p.
3 Robustness check
3.1 What if firms can substitute borrowing sources?
The results reported in section (2.4) pertain to existing credit relationship and do
not take into account the formation – or destruction – of new firm-bank connections
(extensive margin). In fact, if firms can easily find other sources of credit then our
quantitative results might be less reliable. The regression including the extensive
margin should still report a negative impact of capital inflows, but the elasticity should
be higher as includes existing and new firm-bank connections. To surpass this issue
we turn the analysis to the firm level and look at the change in total credit before and
after the shock. To that extent, we create a new dependent variable measuring the
average foreign bank exposure of each firm before the Lehman collapse. We estimate
a difference-in-differences specification of equation (4).
Table (A.5) columns (1) and (2) show the results of regression (2). As expected, the
qualitative findings of section (2.4) hold, but quantitatively we find a stronger elasticity
of credit supply to bank exposure to global capital flows.
3.2 What if firms and banks are not randomly matched?
One of the main identification assumptions made in section (2.3) was the random
matching between banks and firms so as to create comparable treated and non-treated
populations. The main treat to identification is thus that results to not stem from the
banking lending channel but for some other unrelated reasons. For example, it may be
that weak banks lend more to certain firms based on unobservable characteristics. This
concern can be ruled out as we use firm fixed-effects. Another treat to identification is
the existence of a common shock affecting both banks and firms. Due to information
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asymmetries, suppose more international banks specialize in lending to bigger firms.
These type of firms might be more affected by the Lehman shock since they might be
more exposed to the business cycle, thus decreasing credit supply at the same time
international banks decrease credit demand. To account for this, in table A.6 column (5)
and (6) show estimates for equation 2 also using district and firm-sector fixed effects.
Results are still economic and statistically significant and the main conclusion remains:
international disturbances foster a decrease in credit supply.
Yet another reason why firms might be matched with specific banks is due to some
banks specializing in lending to a group of firms based on observable characteristics.
That is, we need to evaluate whether banks with different exposure to international
financial markets also differ in the type of firms they provide loans. Table A.2 shows
descriptive statistics for firm characteristics for group of banks with different exposure
to foreign interbank markets. Banks in column (0) are banks less exposed whereas
banks in column (2) are more exposed to international deposits. We can conclude
that banks more exposed tend to lend to both better firms – as measured by return
on assets (ROA), profitability and amount of non performing loans (NPL) – as well
as bigger firms – as measured by the total amount of assets. To account for this
firm heteregeneity, we re-estimate equation 2 now controlling for firm characteristics.
Table A.3 columns (2), (4) and (6) confirm our previous results of a negative impact of
international exogenous shocks on the banking channel of credit supply.
3.3 What if credit demand differs among banks?
A concern related with the non-random matching between banks and firms is the
homogeneity of credit demand. Our identification strategy, besides using only those
firms that have multiple banking relationships, also assumes homogeneous credit de-
mand across all lenders. In this sub-section, we relax this assumption by dropping the
firm fixed effects and using industry-location fixed effects as documented in Degryse
et al. (2018). In this way, we keep all firms in the sample and also allow their credit
demand to be heterogeneous across different banks. The unit of comparison is now a
firm belonging to a particular sector in a particular location. Table A.6 column (5) and
(6) report estimates for equation 2 using district and firm-sector fixed effects. Results
continue to be statistically and economically robust.
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3.4 Common trend assumption
What if weaker firms are matched with weaker banks and that event places firms in
the pre-sample on a different trajectory path? This may expose our results as spurious
since we will only be caption pre-existing (pre-sample) trends. We test for the validity
of the common trend assumption by performing a placebo test. We re-access our
results of 2.3 by defining a new timing for the shock and re-estimating equation 3 this
time defining the timing of the exogenous shock as being in 2012 rather than October
2008.18 The results of table A.7 shows a non-statistically significant causal impact of a
placebo shock occurring in 2012 on the investment decision of Portuguese firms, thus
confirming our parallel trend assumption is valid.
3.5 Is the sample a good representation of the population?
Our main identification strategy throughout section (2) was based on firms that have
credit relations with at least two banks. Although this is valid for 55% of firms in our
sample, the methodology employed in section (2) – based on Khwaja and Mian (2008) –
can be seen as a weakness of our analysis. The remaining subset – including potentially
smaller non-financial corporations – might provide us with different conclusions. Is
it possible that the sample underlying our study is not representative of the entire
population of firms? To address that concern, we look at the first step in our causal
chain, but instead of using within-firm fixed effects, we run a ordinary least squares
estimation instead. Table (A.3) column (1) shows our fixed effects results still hold.
Both the sign and the statistical significance of model (2) remain the same.
4 An Open-Economy model with a banking sector
Having established that international banks act as a pass-through channel of global
capital inflows into the real economy, we now develop a general equilibrium model
to understand what would have happened in this sort of framework if there have
been alternative policies. By design, the empirical model cannot not address all gen-
eral equilibrium forces or speak to the spillover effects of exogenous disturbances to
the banking sector. However, it will be key in our calibration exercise in which we
18Our dataset runs from 2005 − 2016, thus making it impossible to choose a placebo period previous
to our main estimation exercise.
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use the model of section (2.3) as an auxiliary model to pin-down key model parameters.
The economy is modelled as a open economy RBC model with a banking sector as
in (Gertler and Karadi (2011)) and (Aoki et al. (2016)). Time is discrete and indexed as
t = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The economy is populated by five types of agents: Households, capital
(and final) goods producers, a banking sector, international lenders, and a government
agency in charge of financial sector regulation. Figure (2) summarizes the interaction
between economic agents. Household members can assume one of two tasks: bankers
or workers. Workers supply their labor endowment to final output firms and place
their wealth as one-period (risk-free) deposits on banks. In the canonical real business
cycle model there is no role for financial intermediation. I follow (Gertler and Karadi
(2011)) and introduce bankers as financial intermediaries channelling household’s de-
posits to finance firms. Besides household deposits, bankers also receive funds from
international lenders and invest in state contingent claims issued by non-financial in-
termediaries. Due to lower monitoring costs, banks intermediate the flow of funds
from depositors to firms. There are two goods in the economy: a perishable consump-
tion good and a capital good. There are three types of firms: capital goods producers,
final goods producers, and non-financial intermediaries. It is a stochastic economy
with three sources of uncertainty: leverage constraint shock, world interest rate shock
and capital quality shock.
The next sections introduce the agents and the relevant equilibrium concept.
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4.1 Households
Households are divided into two type of members: Depositors and Bankers. De-
positors have measure (1 − f ) and bankers measure f . Each period workers supply
labor, Ht, to final output firms and deposits their wealth, Dt−1, in banks. Πt are profits
to the household from ownership of non-financial corporations and banks. The re-






 C1−γt1 − γ − ζ0 H1+ζt1 + ζ
 (5)
subject to
Ct + Dt = wtHt + Πt + Rt−1Dt−1 (6)
Where β is the discount factor andEt is the expectation operator. Rt is the non-state
contingent return on deposits and wt the wage rate.
4.2 Producers
We now consider the production size of the economy. There are two types of goods:
perishable consumption goods and durable goods. There are also three types of
non-financial firms: capital good producers, final goods producers, and non-financial
intermediaries. Non-financial intermediaries purchase capital goods from capital pro-
ducers, store capital for one period and finally rent capital to final good producers. The
timing of events is the following: at the end of period t−1 non-financial intermediaries
issue St−1 state contingent claims (bought by Banks) and use this securities to purchase
from capital good producers Kt−1 units of capital goods at price Qt−1. By no-arbitrage
condition, in equilibrium the price of each unit of capital equals the price of each unit
of securities issued by intermediaries. That is, Qt−1Kt−1 = Qt−1St−1. At the beginning of
period t final good producers pay price Zt for each unit of capital goods rented from
non-financial intermediaries. Final good producers use capital and labor to produce
final output goods. At the end of period t, final producers return (1 − δ)Kt units of
undepreciated capital to non-financial intermediaries that re-sell those units of capital
to capital producers at price Qt. Let Ψt be a capital quality shock. Therefore, the return
on each unit of capital is
RKt =
(





4.2.1 Final Good Producers
A set of perfect competitive final good firms combine capital and labor to produce final
output goods using the following technology
Yt = At(ΨtKt−1)αK(Ht)1−αK (8)
Where At is a technology shock and Ψt is a capital quality shock. Since the market
structure is one of perfect competition and technology exhibits constant returns to
scale, I will consider a representative final goods firm. The first order conditions with










At the end of the period, capital good producers purchase economy wide stock of
undepreciated capital from non-financial intermediaries at price Qt to produce new
units of capital goods. The objective is to choose an investment level, It, to maximize
max
It
[QtKt − (1 − δ)ΨtQtKt−1 − It] (11)
The law of motion for capital is





As in (Bocola (2016)), I use the following functional form for Φ: Φt(x) = a1x1−ζk +a2.








Bankers intermediate funds between international depositors and domestic depositors
and the productive side of the economy – the firms. As discussed in the beginning of
this section, the canonical real business cycle model has no role for financial interme-
diation. I assume that bankers are more efficient at monitoring the productive sector
than households, creating a role for bankers to channel depositor’s savings to fund
firm’s investment projects.
There is a continuum of bankers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Banker i starts each period
with a given amount of domestic deposits, Dit, paying a return, Rt, and foreign deposits,
D∗it, paying return R
∗
t . Both returns are non-state contingent. Bankers also purchase
state-contingent claims, Sit, on firm’s investment project returns, RKt . bankers’ net
worth, Nit+1 evolves according to





Bankers become involved in maturity transformation, holding long term assets
and borrowing in short-term deposits. In particular, bankers receive one-period risk
free deposits from domestic depositors and international depositors and purchase
firm claims on the return of physical capital sold by non-financial intermediators. The
balance sheet of bank i is
QtSit = Dit + Nit + D∗it (15)
Where Qit is the market price of claims.
Bankers lack full commitment on fulfilling debt obligations with both domestic
and foreign creditors, raising a moral hazard problem that limits the ability of bankers
from raising funds from both type depositors. In particular, at the beginning of period
t bankers receive funds from domestic and foreign depositors, bankers decide whether
to divert a certain fraction of assets. If Bankers decide to default on debt obligations
then they face bankruptcy and become depositors. Default happens stochastically
with probability (1 − θ). In such case, bankers returns its net worth to the household
and exists the financial intermediation industry. For this reason, creditors impose a
incentive compatibility constraint such that bankers do not have reasons to default. I
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Φt
QtSt (16)
Banker’s optimizing decision problem is thus





(1 − θ)n j,t+1 + θVbj,t+1(n j,t+1)
]}
(17)
subject to (15), (14), and (16).
Proposition 1: Banker’s value function is linear in net worth
Vbj,t(n j,t) = φ j,tn j,t (18)
Proof: See Appendix (C.2).
Aggregation: As Proposition (1) shows, the individual banker’s problem is homo-
geneous of degree one in banker’s specific net worth and does not depend on other
banker’s specific variables. Each Banker makes optimizing decisions based on its own
net worth position. This allow us to use a symmetric equilibrium and aggregate across
banks. This feature becomes useful as we only need to keep track of banks aggregate
net worth and not the distribution of net worth across banks.
4.4 International Lenders
The country is a small-open economy and the domestic interest rate depends on the









Ȳ − 1) + eR
∗
t−1 − 1 (19)
Where D̄ is the steady-state domestic debt and R∗t is the stochastic world’s interest rate
following an AR(1) process.
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4.5 Market Equilibrium
The capital market clearing condition equates claims on assets issued by non-financial
intermediaries and the aggregate capital stock
St = Kt (20)
The aggregate resource constraint is





The net worth of surviving bankers can be written as
NSt = θNt = θ
[









net worth of new bankers
NNt = ι(1 − θ)Qt−1Kt−1 (23)
Aggregate net worth














+ ι(1 − θ)Qt−1Kt−1 (26)
4.6 Equilibrium Concept
Let St = {K,P, I,Ψ,R∗, θb} be the state vector. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
is a set of value functions for households, Vh, and bankers, Vb, policy functions for
households, {C,H,D}, and for bankers, {D,D∗,S} such that, given value functions and
policy functions both households and bankers can solve their maximization problems
subject to market clearing conditions.
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5 Quantitative analysis
In this section presents functional forms for the theoretical model and describes the
calibration strategy.
5.1 Calibration and functional forms
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value Target / Source
Households and Producers
Discount factor β 0.991 Bank of Portugal
Capital Share αK 0.263 Author’s Calculation
Capital dep. rate δ 0.027 Author’s Calculation
Coef. of Relative Risk Aversion γ 1 Standard
Inverse Frisch elasticity ζ 0.65 Empirical Coefficient
Labor Disutility ζ0 4.9 Labor-Output ratio = 33%
Banks
Survival rate θ 0.95 Bocola (2016)
Adjustment costs ζk 0.03 Empirical Coefficient
Divertable share µ 0.256 Frequency of fin. crises 5%
Start-up share ι 0.007 Bocola (2016)
International
Debt elast. of interest rate ϕR 0.001
foreign debt/output ratio D̄ 0.5 Foreign debt-Output ratio = 400%
Notes: Appendix B.2 provides further details on the calibration strategy and data sources.
The parameters of the model are calibrated. Table (1) reports these numerical
values. The frequency of the model is quarterly.
External calibration: Some parameters are standard in the literature when calibrat-
ing the U.S. economy. Given we are calibrating our model to the Portuguese economy,
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we choose to re-compute several parameters as such mapping would not be accu-
rate. The value of the discount factor parameter can be inferred directly from the real
domestic interest rate. We use data on Portuguese government bond yields for the
period 2005 − 2015. The parameter governing capital share is computed using the
share of capital income over total income in the domestic economy. See appendix (B.2)
for a description of the procedures and data sources. The depreciation of capital is
calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Data on Investment and GDP and
consumption of fixed capital comes from the OECD annual national accounting.
The parameter governing the banker’s survival probability is set to 0.95 as in
Bocola (2016). We use a value of 0.007 for the start-up share also following Bocola
(2016).
Internal calibration: The remaining parameters are internally calibrated. The in-
ternal calibration is a mixture of simulated method of moments (SMM) and indirect
inference. The parameter governing labor disutility, and the debt-to-output ratio pa-
rameter are chosen to target data moments. We use indirect inference to calibrate the
frisch elasticity parameter and the adjustment cost parameter. To that extent, we use
the empirical values found in section (2.3) to inform our calibration strategy.
We proceed as follows. The SMM estimator is




















Where b ia a 4× 1 vector of parameters. Let {xt}Tt=1 be a sequence of observed data.
Also, let MT(xt) the moments from observed data. Also, let {yn(us, b)}Nn=1 be a sequence
of simulated data, depending on the vector of structural shocks and coefficient val-
ues. MN(y(us, b)) are the model moments from the simulated data. The MT(xt) vector
contains both data moments, but also the empirical coefficients from section (2.3).
We try to match a labor-to-output ratio equal to 33%. We also target the ratio of
external debt to output. The annual value for Portugal is around 100% in recent years.
Since the model is at a quarter frequency, we target a value of 400% of external debt to
GDP.
The remaining parameters are estimated using the method of indirect inference.
Indirect inference is a method similar to simulated method of moments, but differs in
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the use of an auxiliary model that can be viewed as a reduced form of the structural
model. In our case, the reduced form model of section (2.3) can be seen as a mapping
from the structural model along some dimensions. To be concrete, we proceed by
estimating the coefficient of frisch elasticity and investment adjustment costs. The
reduced form model in section (2.3) is used as an auxiliary model in which the causal
impact of credit supply on employment is going to help inform estimation of the
employment block of the model, whereas the effect of credit supply on investment
accounts for the estimation of the investment adjustment cost parameter. That is, we
regress external credit on employment (and investment) using data simulated from
the model and require the regression coefficient to match the counterpart coefficient
calculated in section (2).
To be specific, we match the empirical and simulated coefficients as
MT(xt) −MN(yt) = ΩE −ΩS
Where the empirical coefficent is the product of the two-step causal impact of credit
supply on macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we use the coefficients from section
(2.4) and (2.5). From the section (2.4) we have that the impact of credit supply on
employment is 0.164 and the effect of a drop in credit supply on investment is 1.045.
The coefficients using the model simulation are computed as
log(XS) = ΩS log(CreditS) (28)
Where XS = {Employment, Investment}.
As we can see in table (2), the model does relatively well matching the estimation
of credit on employment, but it does not came as close when matching the investment
regression.
Table 2: Indirect Inference
Aux. Model Theo. Model Aux. Model Theo. Model
∆ ln Invest ∆ ln Invest ∆ ln Employ ∆ ln Employ
∆ ln Credit 1.045∗∗∗ 0.822 0.164∗∗∗ 0.155
(0.201) (0.0444)
N 41064 2000 306271 2000
Sector FE X X
Table (3) reports the calibration performance. The model finds it hard to match
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the ratio of foreign debt-to-output as in the data. This happens because the 100%
debt-to-gdp ratio takes into account public debt, and the model does not contain a
government sector.
Table 3: Internal Calibration
Description Parameter Target Data Model
Inverse Frisch elasticity ζ Aux. Model 0.164 0.155
Investment Adjustment costs ζk Aux. Model 1.045 0.822
Labor Disutility ζ0 LY = 33% 0.33 0.48
foreign debt/ouput ratio D̄∗ D
∗
Y = 93% 93 24.8
5.2 Numerical solution
The model of section (4) is solved using numerical methods to look for a global so-
lution. The need for solving a non-linear version of the model stems from the fact
the occasionally binding constraints creates non-differentiability in decision rules. The
problem is amplified as the area in which these kinks arise is not known a−priori. More-
over, solving the model using local solutions would require unrealistic large shocks
to produce endogenous crises. Finally, our exercise uses welfare comparisons that re-
quire the behavior of non-linear models to account for uncertainty. Specifically, we use
projection with time iteration. Given the size of the state space, the grid is constructed
using the ε-distinguishable grid method (Maliar and Maliar (2015)) to surpass the curse
of dimensionality. The model features a occasionally binding constraint which requires
the solution for decision rules to be a convex combination of decision rules when the
economy is in period of crisis and in normal times. A detailed explanation of the
numerical solution method is provided in appendix (C.3)
6 Bank pass-through of foreign shocks
Section (2.3) shows how international financial disturbances can influence aggregate
macroeconomic variables in the domestic economy. The quantitative model of section
(4) features stochastic international disturbances in in two ways: (i) in the form of
international interest rate shocks and (ii) shocks to the collateral constraint of banks.
We can understand this second type of shock as a sudden exogenous event that nega-
tively affects the domestic banking system. To understand the model’s dynamics, this
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section introduces the reaction of our calibrated economy to a shock to the collateral
constraint of banks. Figure (3) shows the generalized impulse response functions of
keys macroeconomic variables to a 1% increase in the collateral constraint shock (vis-
à-vis the stochastic steady state). The economy’s behavior depends on the point in
which we start the simulation. Figure (3) is computed starting the economy from the
stochastic steady state.
On impact, the shock has a negative effect on the financial sector. Due to the
sudden exogenous disturbance to the banking system, domestic banks cut credit to
the economy and their net worth diminishes. The drop in credit leads to a decrease in
investment. Households respond to the initial increase in the domestic interest rate by
switching current consumption for future consumption and save in the form of bank
deposits. Both the decrease in investment and the decrease in consumption contribute
to the drop in gross domestic product.
Figure 3: Colateral constraint shock and Model dynamics














































































































Notes: Graphs plot the generalized impulse response functions for a positive 1% shock to colateral constraint
of banks. Variables are reported as percentage deviations from the stochastic steady state, computed by model
simulation initialized at the mean of the ergodic distribution. Appendix (C.4) presents the computational algorithm
to compute the generalized impulse response functions.
Appendix (C.7) Figure (18) displays the behavior the economy when hit by a
shock to the foreign interest rate. The path of variables is similar, but the behavior of
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the domestic and foreign interest rate is counterfactual with the actual path of both
variables around the 2008 financial crisis. As can be seen in Figure (13) in appendix
(A.1), there was a sharp drop in foreign and domestic interest rates, which is at odds
with the behavior of both variables in our theoretical model.
7 Macroprudential Policy
In this section, we quantify the ability of macroprudential policy – in the form of
time-varying bank capital requirements – to curb-down the impact of foreign negative
disturbances. Section 7.1 compares constant capital requirements with the newly
(Basel III) introduced time-varying bank capital requirements. Section 7.2 discusses
and quantifies the trade-off between lower volatility and lower output. Section 7.4
analysis the welfare implications of macroprudential regulation.
7.1 The behavior of the economy with macroprudential policy
In section (2), we documented the pass-through of exogenous disturbances to the
domestic economy via the banking sector. We might ask what kind of policies are best
suited to deal with this negative events. Specially during financial crisis, countries
see their policy toolkit severely constrained. Several countries lack effective monetary
policy, either because monetary policy is set abroad (as is the case of countries in
the European Monetary Union) or because monetary policy is fixed at the zero lower
bound. On the other hand, during periods of economic recession fiscal policy is
severely restrained due to tighter government budget constraints. What is the role of
macroprudential policies to deal with exogenous disturbances? This section tackles this
question by arming the domestic policy maker with a specific type of macroprudential
policy, namely countercyclical capital requirements.
During economic recessions, banks’ equity and asset prices decrease. To meet
with capital requirements, the banking system needs to cut on credit supply. This
drop in financial intermediation lowers investment and consumption, leading to a
prolonged recession. To address the potential problems caused by pro-cyclical bank
capital regulation, the Basel III accord by the committee on Banking supervision (BSBS)
suggested the use of counter-cyclical bank capital requirements to all its member
countries. To sum up, before Basel III financial institutions had to keep a constant
fraction of capital as equity. With Basel III the fraction of capital bank’s require to hold
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becomes time-varying and countercyclical. We model the introduction of Basel III by
allowing the fraction of bank’s capital requirement to become time-varying. Therefore,
the coefficient of the constraint on banks’ activity (equation (16)), becomes a function
both of the fixed capital requirement, θ, but also depends on the difference between
aggregate capital to output ratio and the steady state value of that same ratio. The
time-varying capital requirement is therefore modelled as








Figure (4) compares the short-run behavior of key macroeconomic and financial vari-
ables following a 1% point increase in the exogenous shock to the colateral constraint
of banks. Following the sudden exogenous impact on banks’ balance sheet, domestic
banks cut credit to the corporate sector, leading to lower investment and overall lower
economic activity. The main motivation for time-varying macroprudential policy is to
allow the productive sector to continue getting credit even in times of distress. As we
can see from figure (4), allowing for Basel III type of policy translates into a smaller
drop in banks’ net worth as well as a smaller decrease in total credit. This lower de-
crease in credit make the corporate sector be less capital constrained and spurs greater
aggregate investment. The intuition is the following. As figures (6) and (7) show, with
time-varying capital requirements, during good times banks are asked to hold more
capital. If there is a sudden drop international distress and banks find it harder to
finance abroad, the drop in credit allocated to firms is smaller due to this bank capital
buffer. A healthier financial sector translates into a smaller drop in gross domestic
product.
7.2 Macroprudential during economic slumps
How does the introduction of macroprudential regulation changes the nature of eco-
nomic recessions? In the previous section we were able to isolate the impact of a foreign
shock – in the form of higher cost of funding – to understand the effect of macropru-
dential regulation. However, a country is subject to a constant stream of diverse shocks
hitting the economy. In this section we use our structural model and look at the typical
economic recession. We use the following shocks: (i) a foreign interest rate shock, (ii)
a foreign distress shock and (iii) a shock to loan quality.
Figure (5) shows the behavior of the economy during an economic downturn. The
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions (with macroprudential policy)













































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions for a positive shock to the foreign interest rate. The blue line is
the model with macroprudential policy as in Basel II whereas the orange line pertains to the model including time-
varying macroprudential policy. Variables are reported as percentage deviations from the stochastic steady state.
Computed by model simulation initialized at the ergodic distribution. Appendix (C.4) presents the computational
algorithm to compute the generalized impulse response functions.
blue line shows a recession for an economy without time varying macroprudential tools
for selected economic and financial variables. As expected, there is a fall in output,
bank’s net worth and asset prices. During the same period, domestic firms also cut
down on investment. The red line also plots variables during a typical economic
recession, but this time in an economy with time-varying macroprudential regulation.
Imposing time-varying capital requirements will smooth recessions as output and
bank’s net worth are substantially less volatile. The intuition is as before: As figures
(6) and (7) show, time-varying capital requirements incentivize the build-up of capital
buffers during economic expansions, that can be used during times of financial distress.
Quantitatively, we find that during a financial crisis gross domestic product (GDP)
becomes 5 p.p. less volatile, the fall in banks net worth is 2 p.p. smaller and investment
decreases 3 p.p. less.
7.3 Trade-off: lower volatility versus lower economic activity
It is worthwhile looking at the behavior of key variables not only during an economic
downturn but during good times. Figure (8) plots the density function of GDP, total
credit, capital inflows, and banks’ net worth using the entire simulation path.
32
Figure 5: Typical Economic crisis































































Notes: The panels are constructed as follows. Start by simulating N = 1000 realizations of length T = 1000 for
each case – with and without time-varying macroprudential policy. Initialize each simulation at the ergodic mean.
For each realization, isolate 10 periods before and after the economic crisis event. An economic crisis is defined
as an event where output, net worth and investment are 10 p.p. below their respective steady states. The panels
report the means across simulations. The horizontal axis plots time minus initial period of the crisis event. The
vertical axis measures the variable in % deviations from its value at t = −10.



























With Basel III type of macroprudential policy, the economy visits regions of both
lower and higher GDP with less frequency. There are also lower credit boom periods in
the economy with time-varying capital requirements, since this type of policy requires
banks to hold a higher share of capital. The requirement set forward by the Basel III
framework implies that average net worth is higher than with the previous type of
policy. The periods of high capital inflows are also less frequent, as the distribution
of capital inflows has less volatility. This is specially important for countries facing
sudden-stop type of crisis as was the case of several South-American countries and
some European countries in the recent sovereign debt crisis of 2011. We can conclude
that the Basel III framework implies that: (i) GDP, banks’ net worth and total credit have
a lower mean and bank’s net worth is higher, on average and that (ii) economic variables
have lower volatility. Quantitatively, comparing the entire simulated data sample for
both type of policies, we report an average fall of GDP by 3 p.p., average capital inflows
drop by 8 p.p. and the average bank credit to the economy falls by 7 p.p.. Moreover,
with time-varying macroprudential policy the frequency of financial recessions is also
diminished. With Basel III capital requirements the number of economic crises drops
by 1 p.p. compared with the baseline case.
Therefore, allowing the policy maker to introduce time-varying policies will result
in an average decrease in output vis-à-vis the economy with constant policy, leading
us to conclude that the introduction of time-varying macroprudential policy entails a
trade-off between both short-run reduction in output growth versus lower volatility
and lower the probability of a future economic slump, as the economy is less lever-
aged.19
19An additional cost of macroprudential policy not incorporated in this exercise is the risk-taking
incentive by the banking sector. For example, Jiménez et al. (2017) studies the implementation of pro-
cyclical capital regulation in Spain, finding that banks with higher capital requirements supply credit to
riskier firms.
34
Figure 8: Density across simulations




































Notes: The panels are constructed as follows. Start by simulating N = 1000 realizations of length T = 1000 for
each case – with and without time-varying macroprudential policy. Initialize each simulation at the ergodic mean.
The panels report the density across simulations. The horizontal axis plots grid point values for the state space.
Vertical lines represent the mean of each distribution
This trade-off hints to the fact that welfare consequences of setting macropru-
dential policies are not straightforward. If the time-varying capital requirements will
curb down output, it will also deleverage the economy and prevent future economic
slumps. This is due to the break of the standard fire-sale mechanism where a negative
shock will force banks to sell assets causing a drop in asset prices. This drop will
hurt banks’ balance sheet and force them to cut lending even more, entering a fire-
sale spiral. Lower leverage will prevent this mechanism and that is the improvement
macroprudential policy brings to the economy.
7.4 Macroprudential policies and Welfare
In the previous section we have documented how setting time-varying capital require-
ments entails a trade-off. This section looks at the welfare consequences of setting this
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type of macroprudential policy.
Our aim is to compare the lifetime utility of a representative household living in an
economy with countercyclical capital requirements versus an the same economy but
instead of Basel III type of bank capital requirements, the economy features constant
capital requirements as in the previous Basel accords. Let S be the state of the economy,
and V and V̄ be the lifetime value function in the economy with countercyclical capital
requirements and constant capital requirements, respectively. Define consumption
equivalent welfare, ∆ as
V((1 + ∆)c(S), l(S)) = V̄(c̄(S), l̄(S)) (29)
We find that ∆ = 1.95%. That is, the representative household requires 1.95% more
consumption every quarter to be as happy in a world with countercyclical capital
requirements as he is in a world with constant capital requirements. Summing up, our
results show that the representative household prefers higher economic and financial
volatility in exchange for higher (average) lifetime consumption.
How does welfare depend on current economic conditions? Figure (15) in the
appendix shows consumption equivalence values for an economy with different levels
of capital and productivity. That is, to quantify the welfare consequences of this policy
change we ask the following question: By what percentage to we need to increase
the representative’s agent consumption in the economy with constant capital require-
ments so that she is indifferent between living in the world with constant bank capital
requirements and living in the world with time-varying capital requirements? The red
area depicts steady state transitions where imposing countercyclical macroprudential
policies decreases welfare whereas in the blue region welfare increases.
As figure (15) shows, for an economy that has low levels of aggregate capital,
imposing time-varying capital requirements will increase welfare. This outcome is
expected as Basel III policies lower bank capital in sucn periods, which increase credit
and economic activity. When the economy is highly leveraged, imposing higher capital
requirements seems to decrease welfare. This is due to the trade-off discussed in the
previous section: the benefit of time-varying capital requirements during an economic
recession is lower volatily, but at the expense of lower economic activity. Economic
agents seem to prefer higher output and consumption to lower volatility. The right
panel of figure (15) shows that imposing counter-cyclical requirements during a reces-
sion has positive effects on welfare, since it allows the economy to recover at a higher
pace. Households are worse off in the new steady state compared with the old one
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if we impose macroprudential policies when the economy is in a boom period. The
intuition is as before: results suggest that lower financial volatility is not enough to
compensate economic agents for the loss of output.
8 Conclusion
This paper started by showing empirically how capital inflows through the banking
sector spillover and influence macroeconomic conditions. We have shown how the
2008 US financial crisis induced Portuguese firms to reduce investment and employ-
ment. We then moved to build a theoretical model to study how we can design policies
to mitigate this negative foreign disturbances to the domestic economy.
Our main policy experiment studies the introduction of time-varying and counter-
cyclical macroprudential policy is the spirit of Basel III. We show how macro prudential
policies can curb down leverage, improve banks’ net worth and lower the dependence
on foreign debt. We provide two main findings. First, time-varying macroprudential
regulation will lower macroeconomic volatility. Second, we also document that the
number of economic crisis drops by 1 p.p.. However, the down-side of macroprudential
policy is a decrease in level of economic activity. Therefore, we show that imposing
time-varying capital requirements implies a trade-off between lower volatility and
lower economic activity. We also show how such policies can be welfare improving.
A key result from our study is that the benefits of imposing macroprudential policies
depends crucially on the timming and economic conditions. Macroprudential policies
are indeed welfare improving but only if imposed during economic recessions. We
also show that for low values of aggregate capital, countercyclical capital requirements
on the banking system produce positive welfare effects.
These results have obvious implications for the important policy debate over
alternative responses to financial crisis, as they can inform policy-makers to the benefits
of macroprudential policies and crucially when to apply such policy instruments. As
a caveat, this policy prescriptions are model dependent as the theoretical model is
calibrated to a small-open economy without independent monetary policy and may
lack external validity. Much more empirical studies are needed to confirm the benefits
of such policy instruments. This is an example of a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Figure 9: Credit Growth

















Notes: The figure reports loan growth from credit granting institutions to non-financial corporations in Portugal
during 1985 − 2018. The time-series was transformed using a moving-average. The frequency is monthly. The
source is the Bank of Portugal BPStat database. The time series name is Sı́ntese monetária - Crédito interno a
SNF.
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Figure 10: Exposure of Banks to International Inter-bank Borrowing Market











Banks: Foreign Liabilities / Assets
Notes: The figure reports the exposure of domestic banks to the international interbank loan market. The time-
series is constructed as the ratio of short-term deposits and securities of international credit-granting institutions
to domestic banks over total assets. The frequency is yearly. The source is the Bank of Portugal BPlim database.
Figure 11: Gross Fixed Capital Formation





















Notes: The figure reports gross fixed capital formation in Portugal during 1977−2017. The series was transformed





























Notes: The figure reports Employment in Portugal during 1998 − 2018. The frequency is quarterly. The source
is the Instituto Nacional de Estatı́stica and was accessed using the Bank of Portugal BPStat database.
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Figure 13: Domestic Interest rates
Notes: The figure reports several interest rates for the Portuguese economy during 2003 − 2018. Most timeseries
report credit interest rates by Banks operating in Portugal to non-financial corporations (NFC) both from the
monetary union (MU) or specifically within Portuguese borders (PT). The remaining timeseries pertain to bank
credit offered to Portuguese households for consumption and housing purchases. The frequency is monthly. The
source is Bank of Portugal BPStat database.
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A.2 Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (Banking Sector)
Low exposure Medium exposure High exposure Total
liquidity 0.0488 0.000175 0.000408 0.0167
(0.177) (0.000571) (0.00174) (0.104)
capital ratio 0.742 0.352 0.0256 0.370
(1.373) (1.373) (0.105) (1.134)
NPL 0.0505 0.0550 0.0378 0.0472
(0.0495) (0.101) (0.0457) (0.0692)
bank size 2.723 3.536 4.006 3.426
(1.658) (1.723) (1.136) (1.593)
overdue 0.00454 0.00263 0.00143 0.00275
(0.0102) (0.00567) (0.00282) (0.00669)
Observations 80
Notes: The table reports mean coefficients and standard deviation in parentheses. The period is 2007:Q1. The
variables were constructed as follows. Liquidity is the ratio of cash-on-hand to assets. Capital ratio represents the
ratio of Bank capital to total assets. non-performing loans (NPL) is the share of loans in default over assets. Bank
size is the log of Bank total assets and overdue is the ratio of loans in default over.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics (Firms)
Low exposure Medium exposure High exposure Total
Cash Flow -618.6 14021.5 103176.8 35292.9
(1819054.1) (1712936.1) (7936334.1) (4679678.1)
ROA -12.86 0.0606 -0.202 -5.559
(5900.2) (111.4) (29.07) (3861.3)
solvability 60.35 410.1 12.85 129.9
(15853.3) (116448.9) (3916.7) (58433.1)
cash-hold assets 0.133 0.120 0.110 0.122
(0.647) (0.207) (0.270) (0.462)
profitability -22.12 9.483 -0.105 -7.062
(7255.3) (1723.0) (24.26) (4791.7)
NPL 0.154 0.0843 0.0920 0.118
(0.345) (0.261) (0.274) (0.307)
assets 1478411.1 3136406.4 9577860.9 4401416.5
(32436045.4) (46595181.4) (212503342.0) (123003365.7)
firm age 21.74 24.60 23.76 23.10
(11.41) (13.77) (13.22) (12.68)
investment 40954.6 172103.8 377108.0 177523.3
(4936562.3) (10261442.7) (8180104.4) (7569306.3)
Observations 381280
Notes: The table reports mean coefficients and standard deviation in parentheses. The period is 2007:Q1. The
variables were constructed as follows. return on earnings (ROA) represents the ratio of cash flow on assets.
Solvability is the ratio of equity on liabilities. non-performing loans (NPL) is the share of loans in default over
assets. Investment is constructed using tangible as intangible assets.
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A.3 Empirical Results
Table A.3: Global financial flows and credit supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit)
ln(Bank Exposure) -3.830∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -4.941∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗
(0.0851) (0.117) (0.302) (0.390)
Bank size 0.132∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.00344) (0.00892)
Capital ratio 8.608∗∗∗ 12.56∗∗∗
(1.402) (3.931)
Liquidity ratio 755.6∗∗∗ 1084.3∗∗∗
(89.99) (220.1)
N 424588 424588 424588 424588
r2 0.000937 0.00352 0.661 0.663
FE X X
Notes: The table shows results for the estimation of equation (2). ”Bank Exposure” is the share of bank liabilities
from international credit institutions. ”Bank size” is the logarithm of bank assets. ”Capital ratio” is the share
of capital on total bank assets. ”Liquidity ratio” is the share of cash on total bank assets. Standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and
0.01 level.
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Table A.4: Transmission of global financial flows to the Macroeconomy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ln(credit) ∆ln(Investment) ∆ln(Investment) ∆ln(Employment) ∆ln(Employment)
Firm exposure Cap.Flows -1.731∗∗∗
(0.301)
∆ ln Credit 1.004∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.235) (0.0444) (0.0471)






Third-party debt -4.45e-10 1.05e-10∗∗∗
(3.56e-10) (2.10e-11)




Cash-hold Assets 0.148 0.0326∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.00648)
N 344082 41064 41052 306271 305459
r2 0.0000963
Sector FE X X X X
Notes: The table shows results for the estimation of equation (3). ”Capital Inflows” is the share of bank liabilities
from international credit institutions. The variables were constructed as follows. return on earnings (ROA)
represents the ratio of cash flow on assets. Solvability is the ratio of equity on liabilities. Debt ratio is the share of
third-party debt on equity. Colateral is the ratio of fixed assets on total assets. Cash-hold Assets is the sum of cash
and checking accounts. deposits Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
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Table A.5: Global financial flows and credit supply (extensive margin)
(1) (2)
∆ ln(Credit) ∆ ln(Credit)
Weighted Cap. F. -3.211∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.169)











Notes: The table shows results for the estimation of equation (4). ”Weighted Capital Inflows” is the firm weighted
share of bank liabilities from international credit institutions. ”Bank size” is the logarithm of bank assets. ”Capital
ratio” is the share of capital on total bank assets. ”Liquidity ratio” is the share of cash on total bank assets. Standard
errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
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Table A.6: Global financial flows and credit supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit) ∆ln(credit)
Capital inflows -0.140∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.0960∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(-10.91) (-9.71) (-22.37) (-23.39) (-20.95) (-21.19)
cash flow 6.99e-10 -1.62e-09∗ -1.48e-09∗
(0.93) (-2.01) (-2.32)
ROA -0.000000210 9.89e-08 0.000000199
(-0.01) (0.73) (0.81)
solvability -0.0000243 -1.48e-08 -1.33e-08
(-1.92) (-1.09) (-1.12)
Debt -3.57e-10 6.12e-11 -2.45e-11
(-0.32) (0.53) (-0.19)
Debt ratio -4.13e-08 -2.76e-09 -4.85e-09
(-0.70) (-0.22) (-0.37)
colateral -0.708∗∗ -0.00669 -0.00790
(-2.58) (-1.73) (-1.43)
cash hold assets -1.061∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(-3.87) (-2.92) (-2.62)
N 426951 331157 426951 331157 327387 324464
r2 0.659 0.649 0.000425 0.000895 0.0398 0.0404
ar2 0.100 0.121
Firm FE X X X X
District-Sector FE X X
Notes: The table shows results for the estimation of equation (2). ”Capital Inflows” is the share of bank liabilities
from international credit institutions. The variables were constructed as follows. Return on earnings (ROA)
represents the ratio of cash flow on assets. Solvability is the ratio of equity on liabilities. Debt ratio is the share of
third-party debt on equity. Colateral is the ratio of fixed assets on total assets. Cash-hold Assets is the sum of cash
and checking accounts. deposits Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
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Notes: The table shows results for the estimation of equation (2). ”Capital Inflows” is the share of bank liabilities
from international credit institutions. The variables were constructed as follows. Return on earnings (ROA)
represents the ratio of cash flow on assets. Solvability is the ratio of equity on liabilities. Debt ratio is the share of
third-party debt on equity. Colateral is the ratio of fixed assets on total assets. Cash-hold Assets is the sum of cash
and checking accounts. deposits Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance




Domestic interest rate: Domestic interest rate is calculated using the cost of credit
to households on housing and consumption (TAEG). The data source is the Bank of




t + (1 − γ)TAEG
C
t
Where γ is the ratio of housing credit over total credit. The data was collected as
annualized net interest rate. I proceed by converted in into real quarterly gross interest








The data source for the consumer price index (CPI) is the Bank of Portugal BPStart
database. The data length is 2003 : Q1 − 2015 : Q4. Finally, the domestic interest rate
is computed in real terms using the CPI.
Foreign interest rate: There is no good data on cost of interbank loans from inter-
national banks to domestic Portuguese banks. It is although possible to gather data
on interest rates paid on deposits made by foreign NFI and households on domestic
banks. The (?) shows this are highly correlated with the Euro Interbank Offered Rate
(EURIBOR). Thus, I use foreign interest rate as 3 months EURIBOR. The data length
and frequency is 2003 : Q1 − 2015 : Q4. EURIBOR was transformed into quarterly
gross interest rate using the above formula. Finally, EURIBOR is expressed in real
terms using Euro-area CPI. The data source for the consumer price index (CPI) is the
Bank of Portugal BPStart database (the same data series as in EuroStat).
Gross Domestic Product: The data source for quarterly gross domestic product
(GDP) at constant prices is the IMF database. I transform into real per capita GDP
using total population collected from the Bank of Portugal BPStat database. I extract




Share of labor income Share of labor income is calculated as the ratio of labor income
to total income
(1 − α) =
CE
GDP −HHGPS + CFC − T
Where CE is compensation of employees, GDP is gross domestic product (expenditure),
CFC is household consumption of fixed capital and T is taxes net of transfers. Variables
are computed as their average over 1980 − 2015. The data sources is the OECD annual
national accounting.
Depreciation rate The depreciation rate is computed using the perpetual inventory
method. Data on Investment and GDP and consumption of fixed capital comes from
the OECD annual national accounting.
Total factor productivity Total factor productivity (TFP) is computed using the Solow
residual method. The capital stock is computed using the perpetual inventory method.
After linear de-trending the TFP sequence, I proceed by estimating an AR(1) process of
the residual to compute the auto-correlation and standard deviation of the TFP process.


































































Rt(Nt −QtKt) + etD∗tRt
]
+ ι(1 − θ)QtKt (38)














Yt = At(ΨKt−1)αK(Mt)αM(Ht)1−αK−αM (41)




























+ exp(R∗t − 1) − 1 (46)
C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Combine equation (15) and equation (14) to get








Use the guess that the banker’s value function is a linear function of bankers’ net




EtΛt,t+1(1 − θ + θψit+1) [nit+1]
}
(48)




























































































confirming the conjecture that the banker’s value function is a linear function of
bankers’ net worth.
C.3 Solution Algorithm
We solve the quantitative model using a global solution method combining collocation
and time iteration (Judd (1998)). The mode has three endogenous and three exogenous
state variables. The vector of state variables is
St = {K,P,D∗,R∗, θ,Ψ}
The vector of control variables is
Ct = {C, ψ,D∗
′
}
The most robust method to solve our model is value function iteration. However, the
size of the state space makes it infeasible to solve for a sufficiently high number of grid
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points. For that reason, we have to resort to alternative methods. The best methods
to solve a model with a large state space – and surpass the curse of dimensionality –
are the smolyak method (Malin et al. (2011)) and the ε-distinguishable grid method
(Maliar and Maliar (2015)). We opt for the later. One of the main reasons the model
needs to be solved with a global solution method is the presence of an occasionally
binding constraint. This constraint imposes a descontinuity into decision rules. For
this reason, we approximate control variables using a piecewise smooth function of
the following form
X = (1 − 1b)γnbTnb + 1bγbTb
Where X = {C, ψ,D∗′} and 1b is an indicator function taking the value of one when the
capital requirement constraint is binding. T is a vector of Chebyshev polynomials and
γ are the corresponding parameters.
The algorithm of the numerical solution is the following
Step 1: Initialization
1. Choose initial values for state variables S0 = {K0,P0,D∗0,R
∗
0, θ0,Ψ0} and T





and compute the vector of exogenous shocks {R∗t+1, θt+1,Ψt+1}t=0,...,T−1
3. choose parameters γb, γnb
4. choose integration nodes ε and weights w
Step 2: Build the ε-distinguishable grid
1. Simulate the model using initial values and chosen parameters
2. Construct the ε-distinguishable grid for state variables.
Gm = {Km,Pm,D∗m,R∗m, θm,Ψm}m=1,...,M
Step 3: Compute the solution for control variables
1. For eachGm grid point, use parametersγb, γnb to compute the value of control
variables for the binding and non-binding state.
2. Start by assuming constraint does not bind and use parameters γnb, solve
for all endogenous variables using the model’s equilibrium conditions
3. at every grid point, check if the constraint binds. If so, compute controls for
the binding case using γb and re-compute endogenous variables.
4. Evaluate conditional expectations
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Step 4: Find parameter values that solve the system
1. Find new parameter values γnewb , γ
new
nb by regressing
2. update parameter guess as
γib = γbα + γ
new
b (1 − α)
γinb = γnbα + γ
new
nb (1 − α)
3. Evaluate convergence as
|γi − γnew| < tol
4. Iterate on steps 3 and 4 until converge
Notes: Solving models numerically and globally using projection methods is faster
and more accurate, but it is also less robust and requires a good initial guess. We
solve the model using Dynare to arrive at a good initial guess for policy parameters.
The grid is solved with the ε-distinguishable grid method. The main advantage of
the ε-distinguishable grid construction is that we can define a grid only on points
visited in equilibrium, thus avoiding the cost of solving the model in points of the
state space never visited in equilibrium. This is specially valuable when solving
models with a high number of state variables. The grid construction follows two
steps: (i) simulate the model. This first step has the advantage of eliminating points
laying outside a high-probability set. (ii) Using the simulated points, construct a grid
of points that are ε-distant amongst them. This second step has the advantage of
eliminating redundant points. The EDS algorithm is explained in detail in (Maliar and
Maliar (2015)). Although the authors provide MATLAB code for the grid construction,
we have implemented our own code in FORTRAN, exploiting the speed this kind of
lower-level programming language as to offer. Figure (14) is an example of the grid
constructed with the ε-distinguishable grid method.
C.4 Generalized Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions show the effect on macroeconomic variables from a shock
hitting the economy at some point in time, when no other shocks are present. This
concept becomes troublesome when dealing with nonlinear models since the effect of
some innovation may depend on (i) the state of the economy (ii) the sign and magnitude
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Figure 14: Simulated grid and ε-distinguishable grid
Notes: The scatter plot presents the collection of points on the capital and productivity grid. The model simulation
points are plotted in blue and the grid points for capital and productivity constructed with the ε-distinguishable
grid method.
of the shock at t and (iii) the sign and magnitude of shocks from time t to t + h. In this
paper I use the concept of Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) as in Koop
et al. (1996). Since the dynamics of variables may depend on the state of the economy
(that is, the history of past shocks), the start the algorithm from the stochastic steady
state. That is, the resting point of the system with no shocks hitting the economy, but
in which agents take future surprises into account. The behavior of variables is also a
function of the future path of shocks, therefore I compute GIRF by using an expectation
operator condition on the history of shocks. The algorithm to construct GIRF is the
following:
1. Compute the model stochastic steady state.
2. Draw M sequences of shocks of length T, {εm,t}M,Tm=1,t=1. I use M = 30.000 and
T = 1000 and discard the first 500.
3. For each m = 1, . . . ,M sequence of shocks, simulate the model. Save M sequences
of simulated variables, {Vno shockm,t }
M,T
m=1,t=1.
4. Using the same sequence of M shocks, simulate the economy, but this time, in














] − 1 (54)
where ut is the innovation at time t.
C.5 Particle Filter
Our goal in this section is to find a way to track the evolution of an economic system.
We use the hidden Markov model (HMM) (also known as state space model). The
problem we are considering can be seen as the problem of estimating sequentially the
values of some latent states, St, given the values of an observed process {Y1, . . . ,Yt}, at
some period of time,t. Define a non-linear state space model as
Yt = f (St;α) + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Σ) (55)
St = g(St−1, εt;α), ε ∼ N(0, I) (56)
Where the first equation is a measurement function and the second equation is a





be the vector of state variables and Yt the vector of observable variables. Observed vari-
ables are GDP, foreign interest rates and the time-series of foreign interbank borrowing.
The following exposition is based on Andrieu et al. (2010).
The problem becomes calculating recursively the state St given observations Y1:t.








p(S1:t,Y1:t)dS1:t. We can see p(S1:t) as the prior distribution and
p(Y1:t|S1:t) as the likelihood function.















Is called the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.
Note that using the state space equations (55) and an initial value of p(S1|Y1) we
could solve recursively for p(St|Y1:t) using (59) and (60). The particle filter is going
to rely on this recursion. At first, the system may seem deceivingly simple. This is
because a numerical approximation to p(St|Y1:t) by a recursive exploration of (59) and
(60) requires the computation of intractable integrals. If the state space model was
linear and errors were gaussian, then we could rely on the Kalman filter. Since our
model is non-linear we need to resort to numerical simulation. That is, we are going
to generate samples from the target distribution and compute the required integrals
by approximation. A further issue is how to sample from the required distributions.
In most cases we do not know how to draw random samples. The literature fixed
this problem by using a clever trick called importance sampling (IS). The importance
sampling method requires an importance (also called proposal) density qt(S1:t) with the
following three characteristics: (i) That whenever the target distribution is positive,
so is the proposal distribution. That is, pt(S1:t) > 0 ⇒ qt(S1:t) > 0. (ii) We should
pick a distribution q such that it is easy to sample from (after all, that was our initial
motivation). For example, pick a normal or uniform distribution. (iii) q should have a
support larger than p, the target distribution. The trick boils down to multiplying and








Where γt(S1:t) = p(St,Y1:t−1)g(Yt|St) and Zt =
∫
wt(S1:t)qt(S1:t)dS1:t. In this way, we can
find the estimate by drawing from q instead of drawing from p.
Although important sampling solves our initial problem, it is not adequate for a
recursive estimation. Therefore, we will use a sequential importance sampling method
(SIS) in which we choose an importance distribution that allows us to carry all steps
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recursively. The importance sampling is chosen so as to have the following form





That is, at time t = 1 we sample Si1 from q1(S1). Then, at time t = k we draw S
i
k from
qk(Sk|Si1:k−1), k = 2, . . . ,T.
A final problem with the sequential importance sampling method is that the
variance of Si increases (possibly) exponentially with the passage of time. If we think
of a filter as spreading particles and giving those particles some weight according
to how close they are to the true state of the economy at some point in time, with
the passage of time few particles will have most of the probability mass, while the
remaining particles become almost with no mass. The solution to this problem is
called resampling. With SIS, an approximation p̂t(S1:t) to some distribution pt(S1:t) is
based on weighted samples from qt(S1:t), not according to Pt(S1:t). The resampling
part of the algorithm will sample from the sample distribution, p̂t(S1:t), rather than
from the importance distribution, qt(S1:t). We do so by selecting Si1:t with probability
Wit. Intuitively, we are going to kill the particles with low weights and creating N
offsprings of particles with high weights. We can see resampling as a kind of ”survival
of the fittest” for a tracking system.
In conclusion, a particle filter is a sequential importance sampling with resampling
in which we approximate a posterior distribution with a set of samples, called particles.
We can see this particles as a guess of the true state of the economy. This particles will
be propagated and updated according to the state space model.
Particle Filter Algorithm:
Step 1: Initialization
1. Set t = 1.
2. For each particle i = 1, . . . ,N, compute Si0 using the model’s ergodic distri-
bution and set weights wi0 =
1
N , i = 1, . . . ,N
Step 2: Prediction For each i = 1, . . . ,N and each t ≥ 2,










Step 3: Resampling For each i = 1, . . . ,N and each t ≥ 2,
1. Resample particles Sit using weights Wit to obtain N new equally-weighted
particles { 1N , S̄
i
1:t}
Step 4: If t = T then stop. Otherwise, set t = t + 1 and go back to step 1.
Notes: We use N = 100, 000 particles. Regarding the importance distribution, given
that crisis periods are usual events (events in the tails of the distribution) we resort to an
importance distribution following a normal distribution in which the first moment is
defined as in Bocola (2016). That is, we find the center of the distribution by minimizing
(with penalty) the distance between the observable and the value computed using the
transition equation. The resampling stage uses the stratified resampling method.
C.6 Welfare calculation
Let VC(S) be the expected lifetime utility of an agent in stateS in a stationary equilibrium
with constant bank capital requirements and let VT(S) be the expected lifetime utility of
an agent in state S in a stationary equilibrium with time-varying capital requirements.
Suppose we increase the representative agent’s consumption in each period – and in





 C1−γt1 − γ (1 + ∆) − ζ0 H1+ζt1 + ζ
 (64)





ln [ct(1 + ∆)] − ζ0 H1+ζt1 + ζ
 (65)
= ln(1 + ∆) + VC(S) (66)
On the other hand, welfare from both types of macroprudential policy equalized if
VC(S,∆) = VT(S) (67)
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⇔ (68)







Figure 15: Macroprudential and Welfare















Notes: The panels are constructed as follows. Compute the welfare value at each state space point for the model
with constant capital requirements and the model with time-varying capital requirements. The y-axis report the
consumption equivalent value computed as in appendix (C.6). The horizontal axis plots grid point values for the
relevant state space.
C.7 Other Graphs
Figure 16: Actual and Filtered Output
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Figure 17: Actual and Filtered Foreign interest rate
Figure 18: GIRF - Foreign Interest Rate











































































































0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Quarter
−4
−2
0
2
4
×10−2 Return K
66
